Beatrice Weder di Mauro<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ever since Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney\u2019s Davos speech, Europe is commonly described as a\u00a0\u201cmiddle power.\u201d This is puzzling. Europe\u2019s economy is 10 times larger than Canada\u2019s and comparable in size to those of the United States and China. Collectively, European nations are the world\u2019s second largest defense spender after the US. Even some Europeans have embraced the\u00a0\u201cmiddle power\u201d moniker. Why?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
First, Europe has been avoiding the truth. Washington has signaled that the era of US security guarantees is ending. Yet much of Europe behaves as if this were a passing phase. Defense plans are drafted on the assumption that the old normal will return, that America will always be there. This is not strategy, it\u2019s wishful thinking. And it postpones the uncomfortable truth that self-reliance cannot be subcontracted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Calling Europe a middle power is a way of shrinking the problem. It lowers expectations and limits responsibility. It suggests that Europe can stand aside while the real contest unfolds between others. The fantasy of being a \u201cgreater Switzerland\u201d\u2014geopolitically peripheral but economically prosperous\u2014is seductive. But Europe isn\u2019t peripheral: It\u2019s where great-power rivalry plays out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u03a0\u03b7\u03b3\u03ae: IMF<\/p>\n\n\n\n